The Implications of Current Welfare Reform Proposals for the Housing Assistance System by Newman, Sandra J.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 22 | Number 4 Article 15
1995
The Implications of Current Welfare Reform
Proposals for the Housing Assistance System
Sandra J. Newman
Johns Hopkins University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sandra J. Newman, The Implications of Current Welfare Reform Proposals for the Housing Assistance System, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1231
(2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol22/iss4/15
The Implications of Current Welfare Reform Proposals for the Housing
Assistance System
Cover Page Footnote
Associate Director for Research of the Institute for Policy Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and
Research Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering. Prior to joining Johns
Hopkins, she was a senior researcher at the Institute for Social Research and an Associate Professor in the
Urban Planning Program at the University of Michigan. In 1978-79, she was a Visiting Scholar in the Office of
Policy Development and Research of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for which she
received the Department's Certificate of Special Achievement. The author thanks Linda Giannarelli, Pam
Holcomb, Jack Kerry, LaDonna Pavetti and Keith Watson for assistance in sorting out provisions, program
regulations, and working with the AFDC-QC data. The able programming of Joe Harkness and David Kantor
and production assistance of Howard Cohen and Sally Katz are also gratefully acknowledged.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol22/iss4/15
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT WELFARE
REFORM PROPOSALS FOR THE HOUSING
ASSISTANCE SYSTEM
Sandra J. Newman, Ph.D.*
I. Introduction
Recent efforts to reform the welfare system have ignored im-
pacts on the housing assistance system. Neither the analyses nor
debate leading up to passage of the Family Support Act of 1988,1
nor those surrounding current legislative proposals, has given any
consideration to the effects of changes in welfare programs on
housing assistance. Arguably, such inattention might have been
justified twenty or thirty years ago when a relatively small propor-
tion of households received a combination of income assistance
from the welfare system and housing assistance from the housing
assistance system.2 Indeed, during this earlier time period, the
housing assistance system consciously distinguished itself from the
welfare system so that inclusion would not only have been unex-
pected but unwelcome.
Today, however, the situation is substantially different. Even
though the welfare and housing systems operate on different tracks
and were originally designed to assist different clienteles, there is
* Associate Director for Research of the Institute for Policy Studies of the Johns
Hopkins University and Research Professor in the Department of Geography and
Environmental Engineering. Prior to joining Johns Hopkins, she was a senior re-
searcher at the Institute for Social Research and an Associate Professor in the Urban
Planning Program at the University of Michigan. In 1978-79, she was a Visiting
Scholar in the Office of Policy Development and Research of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development for which she received the Department's Certifi-
cate of Special Achievement. The author thanks Linda Giannarelli, Pam Holcomb,
Jack Kerry, LaDonna Pavetti and Keith Watson for assistance in sorting out provi-
sions, program regulations, and working with the AFDC-QC data. The able program-
ming of Joe Harkness and David Kantor and production assistance of Howard Cohen
and Sally Katz are also gratefully acknowledged.
1. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
2. The proportion of households in assisted housing that also received public
assistance in 1966 is estimated to be 25 percent. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEV., 1966 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (1968). Included in this statistic are all forms of
public assistance (i.e., AFDC, SSI and general relief) but only federal housing assist-
ance from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
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now substantial overlap. The proportion of households living in
assisted housing that also receive assistance from one of the three
main income assistance programs (i.e., Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Gen-
eral Assistance) has almost doubled since 1966, reaching more than
40% at present. Similar increases have occurred in the proportion
of income assistance recipients who also receive housing assistance.
Between 1981 and 1987, for example, this fraction increased from
about 20% to somewhat more than 30% (1981 and 1987 American
Housing Surveys, national files).5 This overlap is even greater
when AFDC recipients are considered separately. In 1989, 62% of
households with children living in public housing were receiving
AFDC.6 Thus, the majority of such families occupying public hous-
ing could potentially be affected by welfare reform options.
This Essay assesses proposals to reform welfare from the per-
spective of effects on housing assistance. The focus is on the two
welfare reform proposals that have received the most attention
during late 1994 and early 1995: the Clinton Administration's Work
and Responsibility Act (WRA)7 and the Republican Party's Per-
sonal Responsibility Act (PRA).8 Although at this writing it ap-
pears that the WRA will not be submitted to Congress and the
PRA is not in its final form, these proposals reflect the current
3. Sandra J. Newman & Ann Schnare, Beyond Bricks and Mortar: Reexamining
the Purpose and Effects of Housing Assistance 39 URBAN INSTITUTE REP. 92-3 (1992)
[hereinafter Beyond Bricks and Mortar].
4. Sandra J. Newman & Ann Schnare, Reassessing Shelter Assistance: The Inter-
relationship between Welfare and Housing, in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990s 136 (S.
Rosenberry & C. Hartman eds., 1989); Beyond Bricks and Mortar, supra note 3, at 39-
40; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 1966 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (1968);
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 1970 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (1971); U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 1975 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (1976).
5. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., American Housing Survey
Database, Suitland, Md. (analysis conducted using national files for years 1981 &
1987).
6. Sandra J. Newman & Ann B. Schnare, Last in Line: Housing Assistance for
Households with Children, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 417, 422 (1993).
7. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Work and Responsibility Act of 1994: Detailed Summary
(undated) [hereinafter WRA].
8. Personal Responsibility Act, Sept. 23, 1994 draft of proposed legislation [here-
inafter PRA]. The final version of the Act that was recently passed by the House of
Representatives is not identical to the proposed legislation examined here. See Per-
sonal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The simula-
tions in this Essay, however, are premised on the broader political ideologies inherent
in the proposed legislation, rather than the precise details of the final act. Therefore,




state of thinking about welfare reform by the two main political
parties. Therefore, even if these particular bills do not ultimately
make it to the floor of Congress, it is still well worthwhile to assess
the order of magnitude of the effects that such bills would engen-
der. in the housing assistance system.
This analysis is limited to the provisions in each bill regarding
time limits, eligibility restrictions, and work requirements for
AFDC recipients, and estimates how the housing assistance system
would be affected if these provisions were in effect today. This
analysis focuses on two types of impacts: effects on the composition
of housing assistance recipients, and budgetary effects on govern-
ment subsidies for housing. Although this analysis is the first at-
tempt to estimate the effects of welfare reform proposals on
housing assistance, it is important to emphasize at the outset that
these simulated impacts are expected to be extremely rough for
myriad reasons including the lack of many details on the proposals
(particularly the PRA9), data inadequacies, 10 and the inability to
predict changes in behavior that might be motivated by these re-
forms. Therefore, the results presented here should be interpreted
cautiously.
To provide a solid empirical base for this analysis, Part II
presents a profile of AFDC recipients living in assisted housing,
and includes indicators that define the target groups that are the
focus of each proposal. Part III discusses the likely effects of select
provisions of each welfare reform proposal on housing programs.
The key findings are summarized in Part IV. Part V presents some
implications of this research.
H. A Profile of AFDC Recipients in Assisted Housing"
In 1993, an estimated 1.15 million of the 4.98 million-or
roughly 23%-of households receiving AFDC in any single month
9. PRA, supra note 8.
10. A prime example is the availability of data on the current spell of AFDC re-
ceipt only, rather than the cumulative number of months of receipt. The latter is the
criterion used in the time limits proposed by both the WRA and the PRA. This par-
ticular data problem will result in an underestimation of the effects of these
provisions.
11. All data presented in this section come from the 1993 file of the AFDC-
Quality Control (QC) Database. U.S. DEPr. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AFDC-
Quality Control (QC) Database, Washington, D.C. (1993) [hereinafter AFDC-QC
data]. The purpose of the AFDC-QC data is to calculate error rates in AFDC
benefits. These data are based on a systematic probability sample of AFDC active
cases in each state. Data collection is, composed of three parts: (a) a desk review of
the sample case's records; (b) a personal interview with the AFDC household plus
12331995]
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were also receiving some form of housing assistance. As shown in
Table 1, there are are three broad categories of housing assistance:
* traditional public housing, which is funded by the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
administered by local public housing agencies (PHAs);
* other HUD rental assistance, which includes a combination of
tenant-based assistance (Section 8 certificates and vouchers)
and project-based assistance (e.g., Section 8 New Construc-
tion/Substantial Rehabilitation; Section 236) and rental
assistance funded by HUD and administered by the PHAs or
HUD field offices; and
• other rental assistance, which is a catch-all category that in-
cludes programs of the Farmer's Home Administration (e.g.,
Section 515), as well as state and local rent subsidy
programs.
Table 1. AFDC Households by Housing Assistance Program
Category Number Percent
Public housing 437,521 38.1
HUD rent subsidy 625,577 54.4
Other rent subsidy 86,190 7.5
Total AFDC households 1,149,288 100.0
Source: Weighted estimates derived from a sample of 14,702
households participating in one of these three categories of housing
programs as identified by the 1993 AFDC-QC data.
Although the specific design of these housing assistance programs
varies, the primary feature that is relevant for this discussion is the
same in all three programs. Households participating in housing
assistance programs contribute a fixed proportion of their income,
30%, towards rent. The government pays the difference between
the cost of the rental unit and the tenant's rent contribution.
12
Thus, the lower the recipient's income, the greater the share of the
review of additional documents provided by the household; and (c) a collateral
documentation review. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Page Revisions to
the AFDC Quality Control Manual, Section 3000, Case Review Process (undated).
Because the large majority of states do not count receipt of housing assistance as
income in calculating benefits, it is unlikely that reviewers devote much time to
precise verification of whether the household does, or does not, receive housing
assistance. Thus, the housing assistance measure probably contains some error.
Interview with Thomas O'Connell, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 7,
1995).
12. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(a)(1) (1992).
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rent paid by the government. In the extreme case of a recipient
who has no income, the government pays the total rent.
AFDC households are not evenly represented within these dif-
ferent programs. More than half of the AFDC households that re-
ceive housing assistance are subsidized through the mix of HUD
rental-assistance programs, nearly 40% live in public housing, and
fewer than 10% receive rental subsidies from some other source. 13
Despite these variations by program type, several characteristics
of AFDC households receiving housing assistance are generally
similar across these different housing programs. Table 2 summa-
rizes a range of attributes of these households.' 4 On average, the
heads of AFDC households receiving housing assistance are about
32 years old.' 5 Nearly all heads of these households are female.' 6
In addition, the majority of these households consist of three or
fewer members, though households living in public housing are
generally larger than those participating in the other housing pro-
grams.17 Other data not shown in Table 2 indicate that the size of
the AFDC unit itself is smaller.'8 Six percent of AFDC units con-
sist of one individual (the recipient), and the median is roughly two
persons. While the heads of AFDC families across all three pro-
gram types are approximately equally likely to be high school grad-
uates, those residing in public housing are the least likely to have
higher education.
13. See supra tbl. 1.
14. See infra tbl. 2. Note that most of the variables included in Table 2 refer to the
total household unit, which may include individuals not receiving AFDC.
15. The average age of AFDC households varies by less than one year across the
three programs. Because individuals 24 years of age and younger are the target group
for reforms under the WRA, supra note 7, at 7, it should be noted that roughly 23%
of AFDC housing assistance recipients fall into this group. See infra tbl. 2.
16. See infra tbl. 1. Eligibility for two-parent families is currently limited to those
where the principal wage earner is unemployed (working less than 100 hours in a
month) and has worked during six of the last thirteen quarters. WRA, supra note 7, at
43.
17. See infra tbl. 2. This measure of household size includes both members of the
AFDC unit as well as other household members who are not receiving AFDC.
18. Calculations and data not used in tables are available from the author.
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Table 2. Characteristics of AFDC Households by Type of
Housing Assistance
Public HUD Rent Other Rent
Housing Subsidy Subsidy Total
Age of head (percent)
Under 18 .6 .2 .7 .4
18 to 21 11.7 9.1 9.7 10.1
22 to 24 12.5 12.3 12.6 12.4
25 to 29 23.5 22.4 21.4 22.8
30 to 49 45.6 51.6 51.4 49.3
50 to 64 4.7 3.6 3.5 4.0
65+ .6 .3 .8 1.0
Unknown/missing .7 .5 .4 .6
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean age (years) 31.6 31.8 32.0 31.7
(st. dev.) (9.5) (8.7) (9.1) (9.1)
Sex of head (percent)
Male 4.3 5.1 5.1 4.8
Female 95.2 94.4 94.5 94.7
Unknown/missing .6 .4 .4 .5
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Household size (percent)a
One .5 .1 .4 .3
Two 25.0 27.6 25.2 26.4
Three 30.4 32.8 31.7 31.8
Four or more 44.1 39.5 42.7 41.5
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education of head (percent)
Grade school or less 5.1 4.3 4.2 4.6
Some high school 19.4 16.9 18.2 18.0
High school graduate 21.2 26.2 26.3 24.3
Some college 5.0 9.7 10.7 8.0
College graduate or more .2 .5 .8 .4
Unknown/missing 49.1 42.4 39.9 44.8
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Employment status of head (percent)
Employed 5.3 7.3 6.6 6.5
Not employed 82.2 77.4 81.3 79.5
Unemployed 9.3 12.7 10.1 11.2
Unknown/missing 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.8
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Employment hoursb of head (percent)
1-9 hrs/wk 2.8 6.5 5.1 5.1
10-19 hrs/wk 11.3 16.1 10.0 14.0
20-29 hrs/wk 8.5 12.5 16.3 11.3
30-39 hrs/wk 18.2 21.6 23.0 20.5
40 hrs/wk or more 7.7 7.2 12.3 7.7
Work hours not known 13.7 9.8 10.0 11.2
Unknown/missing 37.8 26.4 23.4 30.2
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1995] HOUSING ASSISTANCE SYSTEM 1237
Public HUD Rent Other Rent
Housing Subsidy Subsidy Total
Outside income/month' $31.87 $43.10 $43.77 $38.88
(st. dev.) ($122.23) ($174.47) ($138.70) ($154.03)
AFDC payment/month $335.14 $360.73 $423.62 $355.71
(st. dev.) ($174.04) ($188.29) ($229.44) ($187.86)
Median $311 $324 $403 $324
Race/ethnicity of head (percent)
White, non-Hispanic 23.0 35.3 33.8 30.5
Black, non-Hispanic 55.7 43.5 36.6 47.6
Hispanic 15.4 14.8 22.2 15.6
Other 2.9 5.2 5.8 4.4
Unknown/missing 3.1 1.2 1.6 2.0
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Duration on AFDC 46.56 47.55 43.53 46.88
(months)d
(st. dev.) (49.34) (46.20) (46.31) (47.44)
Median 32 34 29 33
24 months or longer 62.5 65.4 59.6 63.8
(percent)
60 months or longer 28.7 30.7 24.9 29.5
(percent)
Disability status of head (percent)
Disabled 8.3 6.9 6.4 7.4
Not disabled, 60 yrs old .7 .6 .8 .6
Not disabled, < 60 yrs old 87.3 89.7 90.9 88.9
Unknown/missing 3.7 2.8 2.0 3.1
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Children with unmarried 32.6 32.2 28.1 32.0
parents, paternity not
established (percent)
Immigrant status of head (percent)
Legal or illegal immigrant 4.0 5.3 8.6 5.0
Citizen 92.8 93.1 90.8 92.8
Unknown/missing 3.2 1.7 .7 2.2
All households* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Weighted estimates derived from a sample of 14,702 households participating
in one of these three categories of housing programs as identified by the 1993 AFDC-
QC data.
Note: Duration, paternity, and AFDC payment variables pertain to AFDC recipients
only.
a Household size includes the AFDC unit plus other household members not
receiving AFDC.
b Employment hours shown for those who reported some work.
I Gross income pertains to the AFDC unit plus other household members not
receiving AFDC.
I Duration reflects number of months since last opening, not cumulative months since
first receipt of AFDC.
* Components may not add to 100.0 due to rounding.
More than 90% of household heads are not working. The large
majority are "not employed"; that is, they are neither working nor
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
are they looking for work.19 Other calculations not shown in Table
2 indicate that of the roughly 80% of AFDC household heads in
this "not employed" category, roughly 17% are enrolled in an
education or training program.20 Another 11.2% of households are
classified as "unemployed" because they are either laid off or are
looking for work, while only 6.5% are employed either full- or
part-time.21 Among this 6.5% who reported some work hours,
roughly 30% worked less than full time in a typical month, while
nearly an equal proportion worked 30 hours or more per week in
that month.22 The WRA proposes an exemption from its reform
provisions for anyone working 20 hours or more. 3 This exemption
group includes slightly more than 50% of those reporting work
hours who live in assisted housing.24 Because more than 90% of
household heads are not working, however, this proportion drops
to only approximately 4% when all AFDC households are included
in the calculation.2 5
In view of these labor force participation statistics, it is not
surprising that the outside income (e.g., earnings) in these
households is extremely low, averaging less than $40 per month
across all housing programs.26 The large majority of families are
living solely on their AFDC payments, which are roughly $356 per
month among these households.2 7
In contrast to the characteristics just reviewed, which are
generally invariant across the three types of housing assistance
programs, the race and ethnicity of AFDC households are not
evenly distributed across housing programs. Nearly two-thirds of
AFDC households are members of a racial or ethnic minority, and
the proportion of African-Americans in public housing (55.7%) is
about 50% greater than that in the non-HUD rental assistance
programs, and about 28% greater than that in other HUD
programs.28
19. See supra tbl. 2.
20. Author's calculations use 1993 AFDC-QC data. See supra note 11.
21. See supra tbl. 2.
22. See id.
23. See WRA, supra note 7, at 18.
24. Author's calculation using 1993 AFDC-QC data, supra note 11.
25. Id.





HI. Effects of Current Welfare Reform Proposals on
Housing Assistance
A central focus of both the WRA and the PRA is the duration of
welfare receipt. Both bills would impose time limits on the total
number of months an individual could receive benefits. Under the
WRA, benefits are curtailed 24 months after the recipient's eight-
eenth birthday, 9 while under the PRA, benefits are curtailed after
60 months, but states have the option to shorten the time period to
24 months and to set the age of eligibility. 30 As shown in Table 2,
approximately 30% of AFDC households that also receive some
form of housing assistance have been receiving AFDC benefits for
an average of nearly 4 years, while the median is slightly less than 3
years.31 This measure of duration, however, understates the actual
total number of months that a household has received AFDC ben-
efits, because it pertains solely to the amount of time that has
passed since the AFDC household began its current spell of wel-
fare receipt, not the cumulative number of months of AFDC re-
ceipt over the recipient's lifetime. It is the latter measure that
would trigger the time limit provisions of both the WRA and the
PRA. Even these underestimates, however, suggest that these
time limits would affect a high proportion of current AFDC house-
holds receiving housing assistance.
The disabled or those caring for a disabled family member, and a
phased-in group of those 60 years of age or older, are among those
who would be exempt from the reforms of the WRA.33 An esti-
mated 8% of AFDC recipients living in assisted housing meet
these exemption criteria.34
By contrast, the PRA would exclude from AFDC coverage all
children whose paternity has not been established.35 In 1993,
nearly one-third of the children on AFDC and living in assisted
housing were in this category.36 The PRA would also drop all legal
immigrants from coverage,37 which would affect an estimated 5%
of AFDC recipients in assisted housing.
29. See WRA, supra note 7, at 19.
30. See PRA, supra note 8, at § 202a(29)(E).
31. See supra tbl. 2.
32. PRA, supra note 8, § 202(a)(29)(E); WRA, supra note 7, at 18.
33. See WRA, supra note 7, at 8-9.
34. See supra tbl. 2.
35. See PRA, supra note 8, at § 105.
36. See supra tbl. 2.
37. PRA, supra note 8, §. 401. Those accorded refugee status would not be
dropped, however.
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A. Simulated Impacts of the Work and Responsibility Act on
the Housing Assistance System
As noted earlier, the simulations in this Article are based on
three key features of the WRA and the PRA: (i) time limits on the
receipt of AFDC assistance; (ii) eligibility criteria; and (iii) work
requirements. Under the WRA, any custodial parent 24 years of
age or younger 38 who has accumulated 24 months of AFDC since
turning 18 years of age would be required to work, either in wage-
paying unsubsidized jobs, or in subsidized jobs known as the
WORK program.39 Three groups would be exempt from these pro-
visions, however:
* a single parent with a child younger than 12 months except if
the child was conceived while the parent was on AFDC;4°
* anyone working part time or more (at least 20 hours per
week);41
" anyone disabled, caring for a disabled family member, or 60
years of age or older.42
In the short run, the main effect of these WRA provisions on the
housing assistance system would arise from the potential increases
in income of those AFDC recipients who would join the workforce.
These increases in income would concomitantly increase the abso-
lute amount of rent paid out of pocket by the recipients (though
the limitation of the housing subsidy to 30% of income would re-
main in place). Because, as noted earlier, housing subsidies cover
the difference between 30% of the recipient's income and the
rent,43 under a fully implemented WRA, the total housing subsidy
required to maintain these recipients in assisted housing would
decline.
Several assumptions have been made in order to estimate these
budgetary impacts. To arrive at estimates of the proportion of
AFDC recipients who would be affected by these provisions, this
38. The WRA actually defines this group as anyone born after 1971. Because the
bill was expected to become effective in 1996, we have translated this provision into
age 24 in 1993. WRA, supra note 7, at 7.
39. WRA, supra note 7, at 12-13.
40. If a child was conceived while the parent was on AFDC, the WRA allows a 12-
week deferral. The simulations presented here are not fine-grained enough to take
account of this exclusion. WRA, supra note 7, at 2.
41. WRA, supra note 7, at 18.
42. Note that those 60 or older are irrelevant to the simulations for 1993 that are
restricted to those 24 years of age or younger. They are listed here in the interest of
accuracy because they constitute a group that would be phased in over time. See
WRA, supra note 7, at 8-9.
43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1) (1992).
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analysis has adopted the Clinton Administration's projections for
fiscal year 2004, the year the program was expected to be fully im-
plemented." According to these estimates, 33% of AFDC recipi-
ents 24 years of age or younger would be participating in the
subsidized WORK program, and the remaining target group mem-
bers would be working either full- or part-time.45 The Clinton Ad-
ministration's projections set total income for those participating in
WORK as equal to the AFDC grant. Total earnings for partici-
pants working in unsubsidized jobs has been set to the earnings
achieved by participants in the Riverside, California site of the
GAIN program.' In addition, to arrive at a total income figure,
any outside income a family may have had prior to the WRA was
added to their earnings.47 Finally, because the WRA does not pro-
pose to terminate assistance completely after the two-year time
limit, no one was allowed to fall below the current AFDC grant
amount.48
Table 3 shows the estimated number of AFDC households pres-
ently receiving housing assistance that would have been affected by
the WRA had it been implemented in 1993. 49 According to these
simulations, 98,335 households fall into the non-exempt target
group that is the focus of reforms in the WRA (target group minus
exempt group).50 These households represent somewhat less than
10% of all AFDC households that received housing assistance in
1993. 5'
44. See WRA, supra note 7, at 8, tbl. 1.
45. Although the administration projects that 50.6 % of the target group would
work full-time and 16 percent would work part-time, we were not able to take these
variations in work hours into account in our simulations. Id.
46. In particular, we used the income distribution for those in the experimental
group at the third-year follow-up. JAMES Riccio ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRA-
TION RESEARCH CORPORATION, GAIN: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND THREE-YEAR
IMPACTS OF A WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAM 127 (SEr. 1994). GAIN IS CALIFOR-
NIA'S WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED UNDER THE 1988 FAMILY SUP-
PORT AcT. OF ALL THE STATE WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAMS, IT IS GENERALLY
CONSIDERED TO BE THE ONE THAT MOST CLOSELY RESEMBLES THE EDUCATION,
TRAINING AND WORK PROVISIONS OF THE WRA. FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, supra note 1.
47. Although the administration's proposed bill emphasizes the substantial contri-
bution of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to boosting the earnings of these
new workers, WRA, supra note 7, at 1, we have not added the EITC to income be-
cause it is not counted as income in housing assistance programs.
48. See WRA, supra note 7, at 18. Further details on the simulations are given in
the Technical Appendix, supra.
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Table 3. Estimated Number of AFDC Assisted Housing
Residents Potentially Affected by the WRA
Percent of AFDC
Number of Housing Assistance
Households Recipients
Target group
Non-exempt parents 24 or
younger on AFDC for 24
months since turning 18 114,518 10.0
Exempt
Disabled, caring for
disabled, young child, 60
or older' 16,183 1.4
Non-exempt target group 98,335 8.5
Source: Weighted estimates derived from a sample of 14,702 households participating
in one of these three categories of housing programs as identified by the 1993 AFDC-
QC data.
60 or older are part of phased-in group. See WRA, supra note 7, at 8-9.
Table 4 summarizes the simulated impact of the WRA reforms
on labor force participation and income.52 Prior to a full imple-
mentation of the WRA, only 5,366 households in the non-exempt
target group were working either full- or part-time, representing
less than 1% of all AFDC households in assisted housing.53 After
WRA implementation, this proportion is projected to grow to
8.5% of all such households, with nearly 6% working in unsub-
sidized employment and another 3% in the subsidized WORK pro-
gram. 54 Total income (earnings or welfare benefits plus outside
income) is projected to increase by about 30% from an average of
$4619 pre-WRA to an average of $6022 post-WRA.55
Table 5 shows the simulated effects of these WRA reforms on
the HUD budget.56 The projected 30% increase in incomes of the




56. See infra tbl. 5. Although we restrict our analyses to effects on the HUD
budget, it should be recalled that the third category of housing assistance included in
the database used in this Essay includes non-HUD sources of subsidy (e.g., Farmer's
Home, state and local programs). Roughly 7.5 % of AFDC recipients in assisted
housing receive assistance from this third source. AFDC-QC data, supra note 11. Be-
cause we are unable to project separately the effects of the welfare reform bills on
individuals receiving housing subsidies from different sources, we assume for the pur:
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Table 4. Shnulated Effects of the WRA on the Profile of
AFDC Recipients Receiving Housing Assistance
Pre-WRA Post-WRA
Households % Households %
Employment status
Working in unsubsidized job 5366 .5 65,801 5.7
In WORK program 0 0 32,409 2.8
Total income
Mean $4619 - $6022 -
Source: Weighted estimates derived from a sample of 14,702 households participating
in one of these three categories of housing programs as identified by the 1993 AFDC-
QC data.
Note: Based onl00 simulations. See infra Technical Appendix for details.
non-exempt target group would result in a $41.4 million decline in
the HUD subsidies required to sustain these households in assisted
housing.5 7 As a frame of reference, this reduction would have rep-
resented only .17% of HUD budget outlays of more than $24 bil-
lion in fiscal year 1992, and .26% of HUD budget outlays of $16
billion for assisted-housing payments (including Section 8, Section
236, and public housing).5
Table 5. Simulated Effects of the WRA on the HUD Budget
Decrease in
Increase in Annual HUD
Annual Income Expenditures
Minimum $ 993 $29,307,145
Maximum $1787 $52,702,783
Average $1403 $41,376,110
St. Dev. $ 180 $ 5,297,326
Median $1377 $40,626,182
Source: Weighted estimates derived from a sample of 14,702
households participating in one of these three categories of housing
programs as identified by the 1993 AFDC-QC data.
Note: Based on 100 simulations. See infra Technical Appendix for
details.
poses of these estimates that all of the impacts are on the HUD budget. The esti-
mated impacts on HUD outlays, therefore, will be somewhat overestimated.
57. See infra tbl. 5.
58. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., FY 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY I-1, H-
23 (1993).
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B. Estimated Impacts of the Personal Responsibility Act on the
Housing Assistance System
Although the PRA proposal is prospective and would therefore
apply only to new entrants to the AFDC system, this analysis esti-
mates the nature and extent of effects that this bill would have had
on the housing assistance system if its provisions had been in effect
in a typical month in 1993. Therefore, the effects of select provi-
sions on the profile of 1993 AFDC recipients who also received
housing assistance and on HUD's fiscal year 1992 budget have
been computed.
The PRA proposal examined here offers a basic set of provisions
covering time limits and eligibility restrictions.59 It also offers sev-
eral alternatives to these provisions, which states can elect at their
option.6 ° While assessing all of the possible variations associated
with these options is far beyond the scope of this Article, there
appear to be four main alternatives for estimating impacts.61 Three
conditions apply to all four computations: (1) dropping all children
whose paternity has not been established; (2) dropping all pregnant
recipients; and (3) dropping all legal immigrants. The four varia-
tions are as follows:
Scenario 1:
1. Drop all those on aid for 60 months or more.
2. Drop all women who became mothers when they were
younger than 18, no father present.
Scenario 2:
1. Drop all those on aid for 60 months or more.
2. Drop all women who became mothers when they were
younger than 21, no father present.
Scenario 3:
1. Drop all those on aid for 24 months or more.
2. Drop all women who became mothers when they were
younger than 18, no father present.
Scenario 4:
1. Drop all those on aid for 24 months or more.
2. Drop all women who became mothers when they were
younger than 21, no father present.
59. Because the thrust of the PRA's work requirements is that those continuing to
receive AFDC would be required to work for their AFDC benefits, there was no need
to include this feature in the simulations. PRA, supra note 8, at § 202.
60. See, e.g., PRA, supra note 8, at § 107, tit. VI.
61. These four alternatives are also reasonable approximations of the options
states would select under a block grant approach. See PRA, supra note 8, at § 601.
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The first scenario is the basic proposal set forth in the PRA for
modifying the current AFDC program,62 while scenarios 2-4 are
available to states at their option.63 With few hard estimates of the
PRA's projected effects on earnings available, this analysis esti-
mates the effects of what might be considered the "best case" and
"worst case" for each of these four scenarios. The "best case" is
defined as half of all households in the target groups working full-
time and earning the minimum wage, and the other half receiving
the AFDC benefit that would remain after dropping all ineligibles
in the household. The "worst case" assumes that the only income
available to the household is the AFDC benefit (plus any outside
income) that remains after implementing the PRA exclusions.64
Table 6 summarizes the estimated effects of these changes in
AFDC on the incomes of AFDC recipients living in assisted hous-
ing, and on the HUD budget.65 In contrast to the WRA, which
would affect less than 10% of all AFDC households receiving
housing assistance, the PRA would affect anywhere from 64.5% to
86.2% of such households.66 Even under the best case conditions,
AFDC household incomes would decline under all scenarios, rang-
ing from 3% to 4% under scenarios 1 and 2, to between 12% and
14% for scenarios 3 and 4.67 Under the worst case conditions, in-
comes would drop dramatically to between one-third and one-fifth
their size prior to implementation of the PRA.68
Assuming these individuals continue to reside in assisted hous-
ing, the budgetary impact on assisted housing programs is in most
cases substantially greater than the impact that would be caused by
the WRA. Moreover, the impact of the PRA is to increase these
expenditures, not reduce them. These increases range from a low
of roughly $38 million under scenario 2 (best case) to a high of $1.1
billion under scenario 4 (worst case), which is the most restrictive
of the four scenarios. 69 According to these rough estimates, the
latter would have represented a 4.5% increase in HUD outlays in
fiscal year 1992, and an increase of 6.9% in outlays for assisted-
housing payments. The average of the worst case and best case
62. See PRA, supra note 8.
63. PRA, supra note 8, at tit. VI.
64. Further details on these computations are given in the Technical Appendix,
infra.




69. See infra tbl. 6.
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conditions for scenario 1-requiring an increase in subsidies of
about $358 million-would have represented about a 1.5% in-
crease in total HUD outlays and a 2.2% increase in outlays for
assisted housing.70
Another feature of the PRA that would affect housing assistance
subsidies is the imposition of an aggregate cap on expenditures for
a number of low-income assistance programs including housing
assistance.71 The cap would be set by taking the previous year's
expenditures and adjusting them for inflation and for the change in
the size of the poverty population.72 The most rudimentary way to
assess the effect that this cap would have had on allowable housing
expenditures in fiscal year 1992 is to apply this formula to HUD's
budget outlays in fiscal year 1991. 71 This yields an estimated $24.9
billion that would have been available for housing assistance subsi-
dies in fiscal year 1992. Although this number is slightly greater
than HUD's actual budget outlays in fiscal year 1992, 74 it would not
have been sufficient to cover the projected increase in demand for
housing subsidies associated with the worst case conditions for all
four scenarios shown in Table 5.75
This rudimentary approach to estimating the effect of the cap is
incomplete, however, because it does not account for the fact that
dollars for housing would likely be competing directly with dollars
for the other programs that also fall under the cap including
AFDC, SSI and child support enforcement. 76 Estimating these ef-
fects would require simulations of alternative scenarios regarding
changes in the demand for the different programs, which is far be-
yond the scope of this Article.
One such scenario, for example, is an increase in the number of
families applying for AFDC, SSI or other programs under the cap,
as would be expected to occur during an economic recession. How
this, or another, change in demand would affect funds available for
housing assistance depends on what option Congress and program
70. Id.
71. See PRA, supra note 8, at § 301(a), (b)(3).
72. PRA, supra note 8, at § 301(a).
73. Between 1991 and 1992, inflation increased by 2.6% and the poverty popula-
tion increased by 3.4%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE U.S.: 1994 475, 487 (1994).
74. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., FY 1994 BUDGET SUMMARY I-I, H-
23 (1993).
75. See infra tbl. 5.
76. PRA, supra note 8, at § 301(b).
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administrators choose for reducing benefits.77 According to pro-
jections by the Congressional Budget Office, a proportional ap-
proach would produce nearly a $10 billion reduction in funding for
housing assistance between 1997 and 1999 ($1.9 billion in 1997, $3.2
billion in 1998, and $4.5 billion in 1999).78 Thus, none of the in-
creased demand for housing subsidies by AFDC recipients affected
by the PRA under any of our four scenarios could have been ab-
sorbed if the aggregate cap had been in effect in 1993.
IV. Summary
This Essay has presented rough estimates of the effects of the
welfare reform proposals discussed in late 1994 by the two main
political parties on the housing assistance system. The question ad-
dressed is what effects select provisions of these proposals would
have had. on the profile of housing assistance recipients and on
budget outlays for housing subsidies if these provisions had been in
effect in 1993, the latest year for which requisite data is available.
As noted at the outset, these estimates are hampered by data inad-
equacies, the lack of details on key aspects of these proposals, and
the difficulty in forecasting behavioral changes that might occur in
response to these reforms. Therefore, the rough nature of these
estimates should be borne in mind.
The Clinton Administration's Work and Responsibility Act
would place a two-year limit on the duration of AFDC receipt for
custodial parents 24 years old or younger. 79 After the two-year
limit has been reached, the Administration projects that 67% of
recipients would be working in full- or part-time unsubsidized jobs,
and the remaining 33% would be participating in the subsidized
WORK program. 0 Of the roughly 1.15 million AFDC households
receiving housing assistance, our analysis suggests that 98,335
would be affected by these WRA provisions, or about 8.5% of all
AFDC housing assistance recipients.81 Labor force participation
would increase from less than 1% of AFDC households prior to
the WRA to 8.5% after implementation of the WRA, concomi-
tantly increasing annual income from $4619 to $6022.2 Because
77. DAN BLOOM ET AL., THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY Acr: AN ANALYSIS 14
(1994).
78. Id.
79. WRA, supra note 7, at 2.
80. See WRA, supra note 7, at 8, tbl.l.
81. See supra tbl. 3.
82. See supra tbl. 4.
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incomes would increase, so would the out-of-pocket amount paid
in rent by recipients, thereby reducing the housing subsidy re-
quired to maintain these households in assisted housing. The
rough estimates presented here suggest that these subsidies would
decline by $41.4 million, on average.83 Though not an insignificant
sum, this budget reduction is dwarfed by the much larger HUD
budget, representing only .17% of total HUD budget outlays and
.26% of HUD outlays for assisted housing in fiscal year 1992.
The Republican Party's Personal Responsibility Act would affect
housing assistance recipients by deeming several subgroups ineligi-
ble for AFDC, by imposing time limits on the receipt of income
assistance, and by dropping young mothers from the rolls. The
rough estimates presented here suggest that these reforms would
have affected between 64.5% and 86.2% of AFDC households liv-
ing in assisted housing in 1993, and household income would have
declined by between 3% and 14%. s4 As a result, out-of-pocket
payments for rent would have declined, requiring housing subsidies
to increase if these households were to remain in assisted housing.
The projected size of this increase varies widely, depending on
one's assumptions about how the reform options offered by the
PRA were actually implemented and the behavioral impacts they
engendered. Under a "best case" scenario in which half of all
households in the target groups worked full time and earned the
minimum wage, subsidies would have had to increase by anywhere
from $38 million to $155 million in 1993.85 Under a "worst case"
scenario, where it is assumed that the only income available to the
household was the AFDC benefit that remained after all groups
targeted for ineligibility or time limits were dropped, the fiscal year
1992 HUD budget would have had to increase by between $674
million to $1.1 billion.86 Furthermore, if the cap on annual expend-
itures also proposed by the PRA had been in effect in fiscal year
1992, the HUD budget would have been insufficient to cover the
increased demand for housing subsidies caused by these reforms.
V. Conclusion
One implication of this research is that changes in policy
targeted on the welfare system reverberate, in potentially dramatic
ways, on the housing assistance system. In view of these ripple ef-
83. See supra tbl. 5.
84. See supra tbl. 6.




fects, it is unfortunate that the housing sector is playing what by all
accounts is an insignificant role in the current welfare reform activ-
ity. But what is housing bringing to the table? One impediment to
a stronger voice for the housing sector may be the lack of informa-
tion and analysis on the implications of welfare reform for the
housing system. This Article represents an initial attempt to fill
this information gap through one type of analysis, namely, simula-
tion and projection of the effects of alternative policy changes, us-
ing one database. But it is only a first attempt at this question
which, given its complexity, warrants greater scrutiny using multi-
ple data sources. Unfortunately, developing and supporting solid
databases and analytic capacity require substantial long-term in-
vestments in research. In the present fiscal and political climate,
such investments by the public sector are extremely unlikely.
A second implication concerns the possible salutary effects of
job training and employability programs on the housing assistance
system, in general, and on housing assistance recipients, in particu-
lar. Even if one discounted what may be overly optimistic projec-
tions by the Clinton Administration of the numbers of welfare
recipients who would become employed in unsubsidized jobs under
the WRA,87 the more general point is that job training assistance
may have some level of beneficial effects that extend to the housing
sector. These effects include budgetary savings in public sector
housing programs, possible reductions in reliance on housing assist-
ance among some proportion of households who move up and out
(or off) of assisted housing and, because of greater turnover in re-
cipients, the ability to reach additional households in need of hous-
ing assistance. Arguably, these effects would be at least as great,
and probably greater, if employability assistance were available to
non-welfare recipients in assisted housing as well. Thus, whether
or not the current round of welfare reform activity implements a
strong employability component, the housing assistance system
should strongly consider expanding its own role in this area.
87. See WRA, supra note 7, at 8, tbl.1.
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I. Simulation and Computation of Effects of the Work and
Responsibility Act (WRA)
This appendix explains the methods used to derive the estimates in
Tables 4, 5 and 6.
For each case, a random number between zero and one was gen-
erated from a uniform distribution. Based on this number, a post-
WRA annual income was assigned to the case according to the fol-
lowing table.
If random number
greater than and less than Assign post-WRA Income of
0.00 0.70 Current Income
0.70 0.78 Greater of Current Income
and $1,000
0.78 0.84 Greater of Current Income
and $3,500
0.84 0.91 Greater of Current Income
and $7,500
0.91 0.97 Greater of Current Income
and $15,000
0.97 1.00 Greater of Current Income
and $25,000
The ranges shown in this table are derived by combining two
sources: the Clinton Administration's estimate of the number of
people in unsubsidized employment by FY2004, and the results of
the GAIN program in Riverside, California. According to the
Administration's estimates, 33% of those taken off AFDC
payments would be employed in federally-subsidized WORK
programs. This group was forecast to receive their current income.
It was assumed that the remaining 67% would be subdivided into
earnings categories according to the distribution of GAIN program
participants in the third year who were part of the experimental
group. (The midpoint of each income range was assigned.)
After assigning every case a post-WRA income in this way, the
weighted average for the sample was computed, where the weights
are intended to correct for the relative frequency of each sample
case in the underlying population. The (weighted) average current
household income was then subtracted from the post-WRA
simulated value to give the expected increase in average annual
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household income for the simulation. This increase was then
multiplied first by the number of households and second by 30%
(the amount of household income that persons in HUD programs
must pay to cover rent) to derive the expected reduction in HUD
expenditures.
The simulation was performed 100 times because the assignment
of households' post-WRA income depends on both a random
variable and on the households' current income. Therefore, one
could not simply assume, for example, that 8% of the households
earned $1,000 per year because whether a household fell into this
category depended on whether its current income was less than
$1,000 or not. The Central Limit Theorem would lead us to expect
that the average of the simulated post-WRA incomes would
converge to the true value. While there are no hard and fast rules
about the number of times a simulation should be performed, it is
worth noting that in the last 50 simulations performed here, the
difference between the maximum and minimum post-WRA
average incomes was less than 1%.
II. Computation of Effects of the Personal Responsibility Act
(PRA)
For each of the four scenarios described in the text, we com-
puted the average AFDC payment per household before and after
enactment of the PRA. To compute the post-PRA benefit, we first
calculated the current median benefit for each household size. This
median benefit was then assigned to households based on the
number of household members who would continue to receive
AFDC assistance after the PRA under each of the four scenarios.
(The nominal amount of outside income above and beyond the
AFDC benefit was assumed to remain unchanged.)
In the "worst case" scenario, households were assumed to re-
ceive no income other than their post-PRA benefit plus pre-PRA
outside income. The increased HUD expenditure was then calcu-
lated to be 30% of the pre-PRA benefit minus the post-PRA
benefit.
In the "best case" scenario, half of the households were assumed
to have a member earning the minimum wage for a 35-hour work
week over 50 weeks, while the other half were assumed to have
received only the post-PRA benefit plus pre-PRA outside income.
The increased HUD expenditure was again calculated to be 30% of
the pre-PRA income minus the post-PRA income.
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Note that this "best case" estimate is based on one adult working
member per household. It therefore ignores a small fraction of
cases in which there is more than one adult working member. Be-
cause this proportion never exceeded 4.6% in any of the four sce-
narios, the exclusion of these multiple workers is not expected to
have a major impact on these rough order-of-magnitude estimates.
Simulation was not required to predict the effects of the PRA as
it was for the WRA. Unlike the WRA, the PRA contained no pro-
viso for preventing households from falling below their current in-
comes. Since predicted incomes of households post-PRA are
independent of incomes pre-PRA, one can simply assign post-PRA
incomes to households based on the percentages given in the par-
ticular scenario one wishes to model.

